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In the study of utilitarian morality, the sacrificial dilemma paradigm has been the dominant approach 
for years. However, to address some of the most pressing issues in the current research literature, 
the present studies adopt an alternative approach by using a minimal group paradigm in which 
participants have to make decisions about the allocation of resources. this approach allows not only to 
pit utilitarianism against equality‑based morality, but also to study these modes of morality for both 
harm and benefit, and to directly address the role of group identity affecting the (im)partial nature of 
‘utilitarian’ (i.e., outcome maximizing) decisions. In our experiments, across four different samples 
(total N = 946), we demonstrate that although participants generally prefer equality-based allocations 
over maximizing distributions, outcome maximizing choices become more prevalent when they 
served to minimize harm compared to maximizing benefit. Furthermore, reducing the objective value 
of the equal distribution outcomes further prompts participants to adopt a more utilitarian approach 
in situations involving harm, but has little effect in situations where benefits have to be distributed. 
Finally, the introduction of (minimal) group identity consistently demonstrates that decisions that 
maximize the overall outcome are more likely if they also serve the ingroup compared to when they 
rather serve the outgroup. We discuss how these findings have meaningful implications that may be 
especially relevant for recent movements that advocate a utilitarian approach to charity, and for our 
understanding of (im)partiality in lay people’s ‘utilitarian’ decision making.
Over the past 2 decades, ‘sacrificial dilemmas’ (e.g., the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma)1 have 
become the cornerstone and primary methodology in the surging research literature on utilitarian moral deci-
sion making. In their archetypical form, these dilemmas present participants with a hypothetical situation that 
asks them to decide whether they would sacrifice the life of one anonymous person to save the lives of multiple 
others. For example: the prototypical dilemma asks participants to imagine a runaway trolley train headed for a 
deadly collision with five unsuspecting workmen. While those five men could be saved by diverting the runaway 
train to a second track, doing so would cause a deadly collision with a single workman. People who decide to 
sacrifice the one workman to save the lives of the five others are considered to display utilitarian morality, whereas 
those who reject the option to sacrifice a life as an acceptable trade-off, display non-utilitarian or deontological 
 morality1. This quite straightforward approach and empirical operationalization of a philosophical construct as 
intricate as utilitarianism has given an invaluable boost to empirical research in moral psychology, leading to a 
number of high-profile studies (e.g.,2–5).
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However, recently, critical voices have argued that research on utilitarian vs non-utilitarian modes of moral-
ity relying on sacrificial dilemmas, can only provide a partial picture of utilitarian morality. Most notably, it has 
been asserted that the use of such sacrificial dilemmas as the primary or sole means to investigate utilitarianism 
“ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-
being of everyone” (6, p. 131). This work (see also,7,8) as such highlights two important aspects of utilitarianism 
that are not considered by the traditional sacrificial dilemma approach: (1) the importance of (also) focusing on 
maximizing benefit as a key aspect of utilitarianism (rather than only looking at minimizing harm), and (2) the 
requirement of impartiality of decisions in classic utilitarianism.
Minimizing harm versus maximizing benefit. The extent to which instrumental harm (i.e., doing harm 
for the greater good) is central to utilitarian morality, as well as whether or not decisions to minimize harm in 
sacrificial dilemmas should be considered as directly indicative of utilitarian reasoning, has been the subject of 
debate in recent years (e.g.,8,9). However, regardless of one’s position in this debate, it can hardly be contested that 
research that simultaneously focusses on both minimizing harm and on maximizing benefit can provide a more 
encompassing picture of utilitarian decision making. But equally important, it may also shed light on possible, 
fundamental differences in (utilitarian) moral reasoning about harm and benefit in lay people. For example, it 
has recently been shown that priming intuition versus deliberation decreases utilitarian responses when involv-
ing instrumental harm, but not when involving impartial  beneficence10. Previous research in various domains 
has also shown that negative events tend to elicit stronger and different psychological reactions compared to 
positive events (e.g.,11,12), and research on morality in particular has suggested different evaluation standards 
of blame and praise when we judge the morality of negative versus positive  actions13–15. Furthermore, it has 
been argued that moral cognition seems inherently more attuned to evaluating harmful compared to beneficial 
 actions16, and that people are especially wary about causing harm to others (and often even prefer receiving pain 
themselves rather than to inflict it on others)17.
These various findings may be directly relevant for people’s use of utilitarianism-based morality in harm 
versus benefit situations. In particular, we hypothesize that in situations that involve inflicting harm, people are 
especially motivated to minimize such harms and hence should be more inclined to follow a utilitarian reasoning 
to that end, whereas in situations where benefits are distributed, there may be less pressing concerns to maximize 
benefit and therefore more room for other moral principles (i.e., equality, see below).
impartiality. Impartiality is deemed central to utilitarian morality. In particular, it has been  argued7 that 
utilitarianism dictates us to approach moral decisions as if ‘from the point of view of the universe’18, and to 
completely disregard any particular loyalty or preferential treatment to ourselves, those close to us, or those 
who belong to our own group. To be truly utilitarian, decisions should only be concerned with maximizing 
overall benefit (or minimizing overall harm), without regard for who the individual targets are. For example, 
truly impartial utilitarian judgments make no distinction between options that are relatively more favorable for 
an outgroup versus options that are relatively more favorable to an ingroup, insofar the overall outcome is the 
same. However, although some studies have considered the role of the identity of the targets (e.g.,19,20), this issue 
remains unaddressed in most research using the traditional sacrificial dilemma approach, simply because these 
hypothetical dilemmas usually contain no information whatsoever that could lead to partiality. Or as researchers 
recently have put it: the current state of the literature is that of the study of ‘The moral psychology of raceless, 
genderless strangers’21. These authors therefore argue “for the importance of incorporating identity into moral 
psychology” (p. 216).
the present study. Based on the current state of the literature on the psychological study of utilitarian 
morality, and on the recent critiques and calls to expand the field, we aimed to develop a series of studies that 
can advance our understanding by going beyond the traditional approach of sacrificial dilemmas. To do so, we 
based our studies on the seminal work by  Tajfel22 on the minimal group paradigm. Using (an adapted version 
of) this methodology as a starting point to study utilitarianism has considerable advantages. First, the resource 
allocation paradigm is very suitable to study whether and when people use utilitarian principles in a context 
that is less hypothetical, and certainly less extreme, compared to traditional sacrificial dilemmas. Indeed, how 
much we can (expect to) learn about real-life moral decision making from research using this type of extreme 
sacrificial dilemmas, has been an ongoing concern exactly because of the hypothetical and unrealistic nature of 
these dilemmas (see e.g.,23,24). Secondly, the allocation matrices from which participants have to pick an option, 
provide a straightforward opportunity to study utilitarian decision making both in situations involving ben-
efit (e.g. bonus points) and in situations involving harm (e.g., penalties) simultaneously, and responses to both 
can be directly compared in a within-subjects design. Thirdly, developed to investigate ingroup favoritism, the 
minimal groups paradigm inherently incorporates group identity as a core variable in the design, thereby mak-
ing it especially suitable to study the (im)partiality of people’s decision making (see e.g.,25). Finally, whereas in 
traditional sacrificial dilemmas, a prohibiting deontological morality is the only alternative for utilitarianism, 
the minimal group paradigm allows to pit utilitarian morality against a different (and arguably more commonly 
used and relatable) moral principle: equality. Recent work in the context of the Moral Machine  Experiment26 
suggests that, if only given the option to do so, people often prefer to treat people  equally27, and the extensive 
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fairness literature (e.g.,28–31) has demonstrated the value people attach to equal outcomes in resource allocations. 
However, being concerned about equality is distinctively non-utilitarian, because although in some cases it may 
be framed as a form of consequentialism, it does not aim for the greater overall  benefit7.
Results
We report statistical tests based on linear models because the results from this approach are straightforward 
and easy to interpret. Results based on an alternative, multinomial approach are available through the osf page 
associated with this project (https ://osf.io/mbcqp /). Importantly, all major findings and conclusions are sup-
ported by both analytical methods.
Study 1 data were collected in two independent samples (N = 217, and N = 208). Participants first had to choose 
which of two paintings (Klee or Kandinsky) they liked best, after which they received a task in which they had 
to allocate points to pairs of other students, identified only by their participant code and painting preference 
group. The allocations were made through a series of matrices modelled as simplified versions of Tajfel’s matrices, 
which presented either a distribution of bonus points, or of penalties. For each matrix (e.g., + 4/+ 4 vs + 6/+ 4 
vs + 7/+ 2), participants had to choose one of three distribution options: the ‘Equality’ option simply distributed 
points equally between the two targets (e.g., + 4/+ 4). The ‘Maximizing’ option presented a distribution that 
awarded the most points combined, hence maximizing overall outcome and thereby aligning with utilitarian 
morality. However, points were not equally distributed between the two recipients (e.g. + 6/+ 4). Note that the 
presence of this option also entails that the matrices are not a zero-sum situation where relative gains for one 
party inevitably result in an equally large relative loss for the other party. Importantly, in half of the matrices the 
maximizing option was relatively more favorable for the ingroup member compared to the outgroup member, 
whereas in the other half of the matrices it was relatively more favorable for the outgroup member. As such, the 
present design allows to investigate whether the ‘utilitarian’, outcome maximizing approach, is used in an impar-
tial way. Finally, the ‘Competition’ option provided the most absolute and relative benefit for the fellow ingroup 
member at the expense of the outgroup member (e.g., + 7/+ 2). Insofar this option can be linked to morality, it 
certainly demonstrates uncut partiality.
General distribution of equality, maximizing, and competition choices (Study 1). The distribu-
tion of choices across the benefit vs harm, and ingroup vs outgroup maximizing advantage matrices in Sample 
1 and Sample 2 show that, in both samples, the Equality option (M = 0.75, SE = 0.02, and M = 0.71, SE = 0.02) 
was chosen most frequently, and significantly more than the Maximizing option (M = 0.16, SE = 0.02; M = 0.20, 
SE = 0.02): t(216) = 14.83, Cohen’s d = 1.90, and t(207) = 12.39, d = 1.65, both p < 0.001. The Competition option 
was chosen the least frequently (M = 0.09, SE = 0.02; M = 0.08, SE = 0.01), and significantly less often than the 
Maximizing option: t(216) =  − 3.17, p = 0.002, d = 0.30, and t(207) = − 5.28, p < 0.001, d = 0.51.
Impact of outcome type and group benefit on maximizing choice (Study 1). We tested if out-
come Maximizing choices are influenced by the type of outcome, i.e., whether participants had to distribute 
bonus points (benefit) or penalties (harm), and if Maximizing choices are influenced by the advantaged group, 
i.e., whether the choice was relatively more favorable to the ingroup member or to the outgroup member. 
Therefore, in each sample, a 2 × 2 Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of Maximizing 
choices, with type of outcome (Benefit vs Harm) and group (relative ingroup benefit vs relative outgroup benefit) 
as within-subject factors (see Fig. 1).
The significant main effect of Outcome type; F(1,216) = 7.75, p = 0.006, Cohen’s f = 0.24, and F(1,207) = 4.85, 
p = 0.029, f = 0.21, in sample 1 and sample 2 respectively, showed that participants chose the outcome Maximiz-
ing option significantly more when it served to minimize harm (M = 0.19, SE = 0.02, and M = 0.23, SE = 0.03), 
compared to when it maximized benefit (M = 0.13, SE = 0.02, and M = 0.18, SE = 0.02).
The significant main effect of beneficiary group; F(1,216) = 11.06, p = 0.001, f = 0.24, and F(1,207) = 28.67, 
p < 0.001, f = 0.48, in sample 1 and sample 2 respectively, demonstrated that participants were also more inclined 
to choose the Maximizing option when this option relatively benefited the ingroup member more (M = 0.19, 
SE = 0.02, and M = 0.27, SE = 0.03), compared to when it relatively benefited the outgroup member more (M = 0.13, 
SE = 0.02, and M = 0.14, SE = 0.02).
Finally, no significant interaction effect was found; F(1,216) = 0.16, p = 0.692, f = 0.03, and F(1,207) = 0.15, 
p = 0.697, f = 0.03, in sample 1 and sample 2 respectively (see Fig. 1).
Study 2 data were collected in two new, independent samples (N = 268, and N = 253). Although the low overall 
proportions of Maximizing choices in Study 1 are informative of how (un)common such choices are when 
competing with Equality-based morality, they may hamper a powerful examination of how harm vs benefit, 
and outgroup vs ingroup may influence Maximizing choices. Therefore, in the first part of the second study 
(further referred to as Study 2a), we kept an identical design but reduced the objective value of the Equality 
option by lowering the bonus points or increasing the penalties in these choices. In essence, we adapted the 
matrices to ensure that the Equality options were the objectively worst choice out of all possible options in 
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terms of overall and individual outcomes (e.g., + 6/+ 4 vs + 2/+ 2 vs + 7/+ 2, for the Maximizing, Equality, and 
Competition option respectively). Additionally, in the second part of this study (further referred to as Study 2b), 
we presented participants with an additional set of matrices that contained both stimuli with a standard value 
for the Equality option (as in Study 1) and with a low value for the Equality option (as in Study 2a). Unlike the 
previous set however, in these matrices, participants had to distribute the bonuses/penalties between either two 
ingroup members, or between two outgroup members. The latter (within-subject) manipulation allowed to also 
test whether participants are more inclined to maximize outcomes when distributing points within the ingroup 
compared to distributing points within the outgroup.
General distribution of equality, maximizing, and competition choices between groups (Study 
2a). The distribution of choices across the benefit vs harm, and ingroup vs outgroup maximizing advantage 
matrices in Sample 3 and Sample 4 show a different pattern compared to the samples of Study 1. With the adapted 
matrices, the proportions representing how often the Equality option (M = 0.51, SE = 0.04, and M = 0.49, SE = 0.04) 
and the Utilitarian option (M = 0.42, SE = 0.03; M = 0.40, SE = 0.03) were chosen, were much closer, although the 
difference was still significant; t(267) = 2.268, p = 0.024, Cohen’s d = 0.27, and t(252) = 2.295, p = 0.023, d = 0.28, 
for sample 3 and sample 4, respectively. The Competition option was chosen the least frequently (M = 0.07, 
SE = 0.02; M = 0.10, SE = 0.02), and significantly less often than the Utilitarian option; t(267) =  − 13.458, d = − 
1.25, and t(252) =  − 12.275, d = − 1.11, both p < 0.001.
Impact of outcome type and group benefit on maximizing choice (Study 2a). Similar to Study 
1, in each sample, a 2 × 2 Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of outcome Maximizing 
choices, with type of outcome (Benefit vs Harm) and group (relative ingroup benefit vs relative outgroup benefit) 
as within-subject factors (see Fig. 2).
The significant main effect of Outcome type; F(1,267) = 120.16, p < 0.001, Cohen’s f = 1.33, and F(1,252) = 98.60, 
p < 0.001, f = 1.10, in sample 3 and sample 4 respectively, showed that participants chose the outcome Maximizing 
option dramatically more often when it served to minimize harm (M = 0.58, SE = 0.02, and M = 0.55, SE = 0.03), 
compared to when it maximized benefit (M = 0.25, SE = 0.03, and M = 0.25, SE = 0.02).
The significant main effect of beneficiary group; F(1,267) = 23.93, p < 0.001, f = 0.35, and F(1,252) = 56.79, 
p < 0.001, f = 0.58, in sample 3 and sample 4 respectively, again demonstrated that participants were also more 
inclined to choose the Maximizing option when this option was relatively more favorable to the ingroup member 
compared to the outgroup member (M = 0.46, SE = 0.02, and M = 0.48, SE = 0.02), instead of the other way around 
(M = 0.37, SE = 0.02, and M = 0.32, SE = 0.02).
Finally, again, no significant interaction effect was found; F(1,267) = 0.62, p = 0.803, f = 0.02, and 
F(1,252) = 0.32, p = 0.570, f = 0.04, in sample 3 and sample 4, respectively.
Compared to the samples of Study 1, the increased proportion of outcome Maximizing choices in harm 
allocation situations is especially remarkable. This is visualized in Fig. 3, which shows that in all the other com-
binations, Equality choices still represent a vast majority of all choices, but the tables are flipped in the low value 
equality with harm distribution conditions.
Figure 1.  Proportion of outcome Maximizing choices as a function of target group (Ingroup versus Outgroup) 
and type of outcome (Benefit versus Harm). The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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General distribution of equality, maximizing, and competition choices within groups (Study 
2b). The distribution of choices across the second set of matrices in sample 3 and 4 was computed. Given 
that this set contains both matrices with standard values and low values for the Equality option, we expected 
distributions that lie in between those of Study 1 and Study 2a with regard to Equality and Maximizing choices. 
Also, given that in this second set, the distribution within each matrix does not pertain members from different 
groups, but instead between ingroup members or between outgroup members, it should make little sense for 
participants to choose the Competitive option, and hence we expect that the instances in which this option is 
chosen would be negligible.
The results show no overall, significant difference in sample 3 between the number of times the Equality 
option (M = 0.51, SE = 0.02) and the Maximizing option (M = 0.46, SE = 0.02) was chosen; t(267) = 1.13, p = 0.261, 
Cohen’s d = 0.14, whereas in sample 4 the Equality option (M = 0.59, SE = 0.02) is chosen significantly more often 
than the Maximizing option (M = 0.38, SE = 0.02); t(252) = 4.74, p < 0.001, d = 0.59. As expected, the Competition 
option was chosen only very rarely (M = 0.03, SE = 0.01; M = 0.03, SE = 0.01), and significantly less often than the 
Maximizing option; t(267) =  − 17.75, and t(252) =  − 15.23, both p < 0.001, both d > 1.42.
Impact of outcome type, group benefit, and equality value on maximizing choice (Study 
2b). We tested whether Maximizing choices are influenced by the type of outcome, the value of the Equality 
option, and the type of group to which both targets belong. Therefore, in each sample, a 2 × 2 × 2 Repeated meas-
ures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of Maximizing choices, with type of outcome (Benefit vs Harm), 
Figure 2.  Proportion of outcome Maximizing choices as a function of target group (Ingroup versus Outgroup) 
and type of outcome (Benefit versus Harm).
Figure 3.  Proportion of Equality, Maximizing, and Competition choices as a function of type of outcome 
(Benefit versus Harm) and Equality option value (Standard versus Low) across the four samples of Study 1 and 
Study 2a.
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group (two ingroup members versus two outgroup members), and value of the Equality option (standards versus 
low), as within-subject factors (see Fig. 4).
The significant main effect of Outcome type; F(1,267) = 74.24, p < 0.001, Cohen’s f = 1.00, and F(1,252) = 101.77, 
p < 0.001, f = 1.00, in sample 3 and sample 4 respectively, showed that participants chose the Maximizing option 
clearly more often when it served to minimize harm (M = 0.55, SE = 0.03, and M = 0.48, SE = 0.04), compared to 
when it maximized benefit (M = 0.37, SE = 0.03, and M = 0.29, SE = 0.02).
The significant main effect of target group; F(1,267) = 38.71, p < 0.001, f = 0.45, and F(1,252) = 45.18, p < 0.001, 
f = 0.53, in sample 3 and sample 4 respectively, demonstrated that participants were also more inclined to choose 
the Maximizing option when they had to distribute resources between members of the own group (M = 0.50, 
SE = 0.02, and M = 0.43, SE = 0.02), compared to between members of the outgroup (M = 0.42, SE = 0.02, and 
M = 0.33, SE = 0.02).
The significant main effect of Equality value; F(1,267) = 95.78, p < 0.001, f = 0.97, and F(1,252) = 59.79, p < 0.001, 
f = 0.74, in sample 3 and sample 4 respectively, demonstrated that participants were also more inclined to choose 
the Maximizing option when the Equality option was objectively low in value (M = 0.54, SE = 0.02, and M = 0.45, 
SE = 0.02), compared to the standard value (M = 0.37, SE = 0.03, and M = 0.31, SE = 0.02).
However, one significant interaction effect consistently emerged in both samples, qualifying the latter main 
effect. In particular, the effect of Equality value was dependent on the type of Outcome, F(1,267) = 19.77, p < 0.001, 
f = 0.36, and F(1,252) = 33.07, p < 0.001, f = 0.45. As can be seen in Fig. 4, for matrices where penalties had to be 
allocated, a low value of the Equality option yielded much more Maximizing choices compared to matrices with 
a standard value for the Equality option, but this effect was substantially reduced for the allocation of benefits. 
This interaction effect is very much in line with the overview of Study 1 and Study 2a, presented in Fig. 3.
Additionally, whereas no further interaction effects were significant in sample 4, there were two additional 
interactions in sample 3. Closer inspection of these effects showed that they merely qualified the strength but 
not the direction of the main effect of Outcome type, and of the interaction between Outcome type and Equality 
Value. In particular, the impact of harm versus benefit distribution was present for both outgroup and ingroup 
distribution, but slightly stronger when the allocation only involved outgroup members, F(1,267) = 4.22, p = 0.04, 
Figure 4.  Proportion of Maximizing choices as a function of target group (all Ingroup versus all Outgroup), 
type of outcome (Benefit versus Harm), and Equality Value (Standards versus Low), for Sample 3 and Sample 4.
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f = 0.12. Similarly, the larger effect of Equality value in harm distribution compared to benefit distribution was 
significant in both groups but stronger for outgroup member distribution; F(1,267) = 13.01, p < 0.001, f = 0.22.
General discussion
The present studies aimed to examine utilitarian (i.e., outcome maximizing) moral decision making, going 
beyond the traditional sacrificial dilemma methodology. By using an adapted version of the allocation task in 
the minimal group  paradigm22, our approach not only allowed to pit utilitarianism against common equality-
based morality, but also to study these modes of morality for both harm and benefit, and to directly address 
the role of group identity and impartiality. As such we are able to advance insight in some issues that are at the 
center of the current debate about the nature, focus, and context of utilitarian morality (see,6–8,21). Across the 
four samples studied, the main results are remarkably consistent, demonstrating that people generally prefer an 
equal distribution of outcomes over an outcome maximizing distribution in the allocation matrices, but both the 
outcome-context of the decision, and the group identity of the targets significantly influence how likely people 
are to make maximizing decisions.
Minimizing harm versus maximizing benefit: conclusions and implications. In all study varia-
tions and samples, participants were significantly more likely to choose the maximizing option when it served 
to minimize harm compared to when it served to maximize benefit. This outcome-context distinction became 
especially pronounced in Study 2a, where the adapted equality option in fact represented an unambiguously 
anti-utilitarian alternative that either minimized overall and individual benefit or maximized overall and indi-
vidual harm. Indeed, whereas this situation did prompt participants to choose the outcome maximizing option 
much more frequently when it served to minimize harm, it still did not sway participants to adopt a more maxi-
mizing approach when distributing benefits. This clear difference between harm and benefit situations attests 
to the assertion that moral cognition is indeed inherently more attuned to evaluating actions and decisions that 
involve harm compared to benefit (see,16). In addition to its theoretical importance with respect to the recent 
call to focus more on the beneficence component of utilitarianism (e.g.,7,8), the observation that lay people seem 
to be especially rigid in their equality-based morality when it comes to distribution of benefits may also be most 
relevant for recent societal movements that advocate a more utilitarian approach to charity, such as the Effective 
Altruism  movement32. Indeed, the present findings suggest that in areas that involve moral reasoning and deci-
sions about how to best distribute benefits to others in need, prompting people to do so in an utilitarian way may 
be especially challenging when it has to compete with equality-based morality. Although speculative at this time, 
one potentially fruitful approach might be to frame the message in such a way that it directly appeals to equality-
based morality in the public but still achieves utilitarian outcomes. For example, rather than framing a particular 
initiative as resulting in the most overall benefit (i.e., the most benefit to the highest number of people), it may 
be framed as resulting in a reduction of the inequality gap for the highest number of people. Although the result 
(i.e., maximizing overall benefit) would be the same and even the utilitarian logic is identical, the latter framing 
may more directly appeal to equality-based morality, even if it does not mean that people are treated equally.
Impartiality: conclusions and implications. A second important consideration based on the current 
findings pertains to the issue of impartiality in utilitarian decision making. Unlike the traditional sacrificial 
dilemmas, which feature anonymous targets without any group  identity21, the minimal group paradigm explic-
itly incorporates the distinction between an ingroup and an outgroup, even if the content and meaning of this 
distinction is indeed minimal. Consistently across the samples and designs, we found that although participants 
rarely chose the competition option that blatantly favored the ingroup member at the expense of the outgroup 
member, they were remarkably more inclined to choose the maximizing option if it was most beneficial for 
the ingroup member compared to when it provided a relative advantage to the outgroup member. This effect 
occurred for both distributions of benefits and harms. In fact, on average across all conditions and samples, 
maximizing options that favored the ingroup member were chosen almost twice as frequently as maximizing 
options that relatively favored the outgroup member. This finding suggests that for a considerable number of 
participants who chose the maximizing option with ingroup advantage, it may have been used as a “soft” and 
rationally more defensible version of the competition option, rather than reflecting a true “impartial utilitarian” 
mindset. Arguably, only a choice for the maximizing option that relatively favored the outgroup member can be 
considered as reflecting genuinely impartial utilitarian morality. Combined with the lower consideration for the 
maximizing alternative when distributing benefits (compared to harms), behavioral displays of what has been 
called ‘impartial beneficence’6 were relatively rare in our experiments using a minimal group paradigm, and 
hence one could speculate that such choices are probably also uncommon in other situations where people have 
to distribute benefits. The apparent greater concern to maximize overall outcomes when it simultaneously serves 
ingroup interests also emerged when allocations had to be made within groups. Indeed, in Study 2b, participants 
made more maximizing decisions when allocating resources between two members of the ingroup compared to 
between two members of the outgroup. This further attests to the conclusion that people are often partial in their 
seemingly ‘utilitarian’ morality, but also indicates that advocating a more utilitarian approach to, for example, 
charity may have greater chances of success when it targets people within one’s own community, compared to 
targets within other communities, or across communities.
conclusion
Taking the study of utilitarianism out of the traditionally used sacrificial dilemma methodology, we demonstrate 
that lay people generally are not very inclined to display utilitarian morality in their decision making when it has 
to compete with equality-based morality. Only when equal distribution options also maximize overall harm (but 
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not if they minimize overall benefit), do people show a considerable shift towards decisions that maximize the 
overall outcome. Moreover, such maximizing decisions are more likely if they also serve the ingroup compared 
to when they rather serve the outgroup. These findings have meaningful theoretical and practical implications. 
Initiatives that aim to advance the use of impartial utilitarianism in guiding decision making, such as the Effective 
Altruism  initiative32, have often met with resistance and negative reception in parts of the general public, which is 
commonly attributed to its controversial messages about instrumental harm (see,6,7). However, the present find-
ings suggest that although the proposed solution to put a stronger focus on impartial beneficence may face less 
fierce (emotional) resistance, it may not necessarily lead to more impartial utilitarian behavior in domains like 
charity. Indeed, even when being pro-social, most people appear to rigidly adhere to equality principles especially 
to allocate benefits, and in cases where they do take an seemingly utilitarian approach, it is often not impartial.
Materials and methods
Specific materials, as well as all data, and additional analyses are available through the osf page at https ://osf.
io/mbcqp /.
The experimental protocols were approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Edu-
cational Sciences of Ghent University as part of a larger project (ref: 2016/86 Amended), and all methods were 
carried out in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations. All participants took part in the study 
voluntarily and informed consent was obtained from all subjects and/or legal guardian for minors (participant 
minimum age: 17 years).
Study 1. Participants. Data were collected in two independent samples of undergraduate students: Sample 
1 with N = 217, and Sample 2 with N = 208. Sample size was determined by the availability of subjects. A power 
sensitivity test demonstrated that both samples have at least 80% power to test for small to medium sized within-
subjects main effects of Cohen’s f ≥ 0.195. Participants completed the study either online on their home com-
puter (Sample 1; 90.8% women, Mage = 20.12, SD = 3.61), or as part of an experimental session in medium-sized 
groups on desktop computers in the lab (Sample 2; 78.4% women, Mage = 18.79, SD = 2.94).
Procedure. Participants were presented with two paintings; one by Kandinsky (painting A) and one by Klee 
(painting B). After choosing which painting they liked best, they received a message reading: “Congratulations, 
you chose painting A (B). You are now a member of group Kandinsky (Klee)”. Next they received instructions 
that their next task would be to allocate points to pairs of other students, identified only by their participant code 
and the group to which they belonged based on their painting preference earlier. They were informed that these 
students (but not themselves) would have to come to the lab later to do a task, which would have a variable dif-
ficulty and duration: the number of points they allocated to a particular student would determine the difficulty 
and duration for that particular student (the more points, the easier and shorter the task).
Measures and materials. Participants were presented with a series of six matrices, which were modelled after 
Tajfel’s matrices, but were substantially simplified to serve the present study’s objectives. In particular, we wanted 
to make sure that participants were able to easily and immediately understand the idea behind each option. 
Therefore, for each matrix, there were only 3 options in a variable order: Competition, Equality, and Maximizing 
option (see above). The matrices presented either a distribution of bonus  points2,  penalties2, or a combination 
 thereof2. The combination matrices were primarily filler items added for exploratory purposes and were not 
included in the main analyses, but additional analyses with these combination matrices are presented at the 
osf page. An example matrix (distribution of bonus points with utilitarian ingroup member benefit) asked par-
ticipants who chose Kandinsky to distribute points between KANDINSKY group member dsf-042 and KLEE 
group member jkz-128, by choosing one of the following three options: + 6/+ 4 vs + 4/+ 4 vs + 7/+ 2 (Maximiz-
ing, Equality, and Competition, respectively). Additionally, participants completed measures of Right-Wing 
 Authoritarianism33, Social Dominance  Orientation34, and the Oxford Utilitarianism  Scale6. Given that effects of 
the individual differences measures were very limited compared to the experimental effects, analyses with these 
variables are not discussed but can be found in full in the osf page.
Study 2. Participants. Data were collected in two new, independent samples of undergraduate students: 
Sample 3 with N = 268, and Sample 4 with N = 253. Sample size was determined by the availability of participants. 
A power sensitivity test demonstrated that each sample has at least 80% power to test for small to medium sized 
within-subjects main effects of Cohen’s f ≥ 0.177. All participants completed the study online, either on their 
home computer or in medium-sized groups on desktop computers in the lab. The samples consisted of 84.3% 
and 70.8% women and the mean age was 20.58 (SD = 4.11) and 18.70 (SD = 1.81) years.
Procedure. Participants were again presented with two paintings. However, as a small adaptation to Study 1, 
the presented paintings were of unknown artists and were presented as the work of two fictitious artists (Dusek 
versus Tausig,  see35). After choosing a painting, all participants were told they had chosen the painting of Dusek 
(to simplify the dataset). In all other respects, the procedure for the first part (Study 2a) was identical to Study 1. 
In the second part (Study 2b), we presented participants with an additional set of 8 matrices that contained both 
stimuli with a standard Equality value and with a low Equality value. Unlike the previous set however, in these 
matrices, participants had to distribute the bonuses/penalties between either two ingroup members, or between 
two outgroup members.
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Measures and materials. Similar to Study 1, for Study 2a, participants were again presented with 6 matrices. 
However, the objective value of the Equality option was considerably reduced compared to Study 1, by making 
this the option that objectively left everyone worse off than the other options. In particular, in the Equal distri-
bution option, benefits were equal for the two targets (e.g. + 2/+ 2), but presented the lowest overall benefit, as 
well as the lowest benefit for the individuals when compared to the other options (e.g., + 6/+ 4 and + 7/+ 2). For 
Study 2b, participants received an additional 8 matrices (harm or benefit only). Unlike the previous set however, 
in these matrices, participants had to distribute the bonuses/penalties between either two ingroup members, or 
between two outgroup members.
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